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The classification of governments

4As in the Politics, different regimes are first defined comparatively. The Spirit of Law begins by analyzing their “nature,” what “makes them be,” in other words their institutional structure, the organization and distribution of powers and magistracies – what Aristotle, precisely, called their constitution. The search devoted to the diversity of situations demanded reflection on the plurality of suitable regimes and consideration of how legislation aligned with the character and needs of the people it governed: “the government most in keeping with nature is the one the particular disposition of which relates best to the disposition of the people for which it is established” (I, 3; see also XIX, 21; see Pol., III, 17, 1287b40). First of all, Montesquieu thus seems to share the Aristotelian conception of the legislator devoted to grasping the process of formation and corruption of constitutions so as to assure their preservation: political philosophy must conceive the best constitution in situ and the adaptation of the laws to each regime (Pol., IV, 1). Just as Aristotle contemplates the preservation of tyranny, though an unnatural regime (III, 17), which barely constitutes a constitution since “where laws do not govern, there is no constitution” (IV, 4), Montesquieu theorizes the paradoxical preservation of despotism. The Spirit of Law also takes from the Politics the idea that although “by nature” Asiatic peoples are destined to be governed despotically (Pol., III, 14), tyrannical power is “unnatural” (III, 17, 1287b37-42). Political servitude like civil servitude dissolves the community and runs counter to all friendship as well as all virtue: “In despotic states, every household is a separate empire. […] Learning will be dangerous, emulation fatal; and as for virtues, Aristotle cannot believe that there is one proper to slaves, [in note, reference is made to Politics, I, 3]” (IV, 3). Like Aristotle, Montesquieu insists finally on the tyrant’s or despot’s aversion with respect to the great – whence the reminder of Periander’s notorious advice to Thrasybulus to lop off the tallest stalks, to equalize the citizens so as to avoid any attempt at resistance.

5Nevertheless, this proximity must not be allowed to hide essential differences. First, Montesquieu scrambles the typology by raising despotism to a full-fledged regime: it is no longer, like tyranny, the perversion of a particular form of government – monarchy, and in particular absolute monarchy, one where the king governs at his whim in the total absence of established laws (Pol., III, 16). In The Spirit of Law, tyranny is no longer a political form corresponding to a perverted use of power, existing for the tyrant’s pleasure and not the common good. Associated with the regrouping of democracy and aristocracy under the category of “republic,” the introduction of despotism brings a substantial modification: the classification of governments no longer combines the two criteria of the number of power-holders and the end they serve (common interest, in which case the regime is just and “right,” or the particular interest of the governors, in which case the regime is unjust and perverted). To the numerical criterion is henceforth added the criterion of the legality of the exercise of power, which allows a distinction between monarchy and despotism. The normative dimension is thus integrated into the classification itself – which will even better translate the opposition between “moderate governments” (republican and monarchical) and despotic governments. Secondly, the focus shifts from seeking the “best regime” and asserting a hierarchy among good regimes—an approach that persisted in Aristotelian philosophy — toward a reflection on the worst regime, now used as a counterpoint or cautionary example. Thirdly, Montesquieu really takes inspiration from Aristotelian analysis only when he deals with democracy. He gives reasons for which the Ancients, not knowing the modern distribution of powers, could not form a just idea of monarchy: “Aristotle’s unease appears visibly when he deals with monarchy [in note, reference is made to Politics, III, 14]”. He establishes five kinds; he differentiates them not by their form of constitution, but by incidental things like the prince’s virtues or vices, or by foreign things, like the usurpation of tyranny or the succession to tyranny. He establishes five kinds: he distinguishes them not by their form of constitution, but by accidental things, like the prince’s virtues or vices; or by foreign things, like the usurpation of tyranny, or succession to tyranny. Aristotle places both the Persian empire and the kingdom of Lacedaemon in the ranks of monarchies. But who does not see that one was a despotic state, and the other a republic?” (EL, XI, 9; see also XI, 11).

6It is essential to recognize the shift in analysis between Aristotle's Politics and The Spirit of Law: the reflection on constitutional government (politeia) — deemed the best regime for achieving a balanced middle ground by blending oligarchy and democracy (Politics, IV, 11-12) — is now entirely reframed within the theory of democracy alone. It is in this regime that the Aristotelian definition of authority prevails: motivated by the spirit of equality, the citizen “does not seek to avoid having masters, but to have only [his] equals as masters” (EL, VIII, 3; see Pol., III, 6). But no more than Aristotle does Montesquieu privilege arithmetic equality: because the democracy which gave full power to the people would be corrupt (VIII, 2), it is appropriate to introduce procedures of aristocratic correction, notably by combining the lottery, a democratic procedure, with the election of magistrates, an oligarchic procedure according to Aristotle, an aristocratic one according to Montesquieu (II, 2). Beyond a definition of democracy by the people’s sovereignty, The Spirit of Law thus brings into play the social division between the poor and the rich, “low” people and grandees, in order to justify the distribution of the powers that make up the constitution: if the deliberative power is entrusted to the people as a body, the executive and judicial powers must be attributed to an elite (on this tripartition of the function of the state, see Pol., IV, 14-16). While taking note of the restriction of citizenship, which excludes artisans and merchants (IV, 8; XXIII, 17), Montesquieu also puts the accent on the requirement of popular government where distributive justice is concerned. Whereas Aristotle distinguished democracy, where the legislator must show consideration for the rich by abstaining from subjecting their property and revenue to division, and oligarchy, where he must act in favor of the poor notably by establishing strict legislation on successions (Pol., V, 8), Montesquieu considers that democracy must equalize inequalities by using a whole legislative arsenal (EL, V, 3-5). However, while stipulating in an Aristotelian spirit that in democracy “real equality is the soul of the state” (V, 5), Montesquieu no longer distinguishes the varieties of democratic constitutions which Aristotle attained a priori by a combinatory method. Henceforth the people are said to be incapable of “managing its affairs by [themselves]” (to be compared with Pol., III, 11-13) and its want of prudence as well as opportune rhythm in political action are here called into question (II, 2). In this analysis, The Spirit of Law no longer refers to a just division of power among rival pretenders: the work considers the rationality of the decision (Larrère) and the efficacy of the execution. Even more surprisingly, Montesquieu does not place the logos or deliberation at the foundation of democratic practice, no more than the freedom and justice which Aristotle however placed at the heart of the doxa bearing on democracy (VI, 2). The definition of freedom as security or “the opinion one has of one’s security” excludes defining freedom by the people’s participation in the exercise of power (XI, 2-3).

7The mutation appears equally in the reflection on the “principle” of governments, which corresponds in a way to the ethos of the citizens. On the one hand, Montesquieu adopts the idea of a formation of customs adapted to each regime as well as the Aristotelian distinction between political virtue and ethical virtue. But the political virtue he conceives is no longer linked to the excellence of man and the exercise of reason. Similarly, virtue is no longer the primary aim of good legislation; Montesquieu confines its necessity to democratic regimes. It is in that regime that the purity of customs sustains obedience to the laws, in keeping with Aristotle’s opinion, in agreement here with Plato: “Aristotle, who seems to have written his Politics only to counter Plato’s opinions with his own, nevertheless agrees with him on the power of music over manners. [...] This is not an opinion hazarded without reflection: it is one of the principles of their politics. That is how they gave laws, and that is how they wanted the cities to be governed.” (IV, 8).

8In this respect, the issue of corruption appears decisive: book VIII of The Spirit of Law includes important references to book V of the Politics. The corruption of democracy comes into play, indeed, at the moment of passage from the spirit of equality, which consists of wanting to obey and command one’s equals, to the spirit of “extreme” equality or refusal of all hierarchy (VIII, 2-3). Now among the general causes of the corruption of regimes, Aristotle had invoked the diversity of conceptions of justice: while all agreed on defining it as proportional equality, democrats, wanting to achieve absolute justice, sometimes require absolute equality, which is a cause of seditions in order to abolish any inequality among equals (V, 1). The passionate pursuit of equality is therefore the most important cause of revolution in democracies: freedom is transformed into license (V, 9). Excess freedom is then transformed into excess servitude, and democracy into tyranny (IV, 4; V, 5). It is this analysis, inspired by Plato, that Montesquieu adopts (VIII, 2). The Spirit of Law follows the analysis of particular causes of corruption: the growing power of a body or of a fraction of the city is a source of jealousy toward those who govern and of constitutional instability, which can be produced during the great military successes (V, 4; see VIII, 4). Reflection on the corruption of the principle of aristocracy (V, 4) can itself take advantage of a certain relation with Aristotle: dissensions can arise in oligarchies when the government becomes exclusive and hereditary, and in aristocracies “because all the honors go to only a small number” (V, 6-7). In this case, it is better to perennialize the power of the governors by causing the state to fear something (EL, V, 5; see Pol., V, 8). In analyzing the corruption of modern monarchy, Montesquieu, while seeming to diverge from Aristotle, aligns with him in identifying the excessive growth of monarchical power and disregard for the law as key causes of such corruption (V, 10). There remains, however, an essential divergence: whereas Aristotle, like Plato, insisted on the importance of the virtue or vice of the governors (corrupted or unjust forms being those where power is exercised in favor of individual interest, and not of the common good), Montesquieu no longer grants any role to intentions nor to goals aimed at by those who hold power. The risk is henceforth the corruption of the “principle” that motivates governed and governors alike.

9In The Spirit of Law, this corruption of the principle stems notably from changes in the morphology of the territory, reflecting yet another adaptation of Aristotle's analysis of the state's ideal balance. In the Politics, Aristotle posited the principle of a relationship between city size (population and territory) and political end (justice). The same goes for the size of the territory: its size must be limited, against politics of conquest, so it can be defended and men can be able to lead a free life there (VII, 4-5). Now Montesquieu for his part does not adopt these reasons associated with the Aristotelian concept of autarchy, which is no longer pertinent in the context of modern physics. If the critique of the politics of conquest is reiterated, that is now justified, without finalism, by the state of relations of forces between political bodies (VIII, 20; IX, 6).

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Justice and freedom

10Against the Hobbesian reduction of the political art to political science, Montesquieu reclaims Aristotle’s theory of prudence: states are not artifacts but products of nature and of history. Faced with the technical model, deducing the rational principles proper to make states last forever, from the science of human nature (Hobbes, Leviathan, London: Penguin Classics, 1985, chap. 29, p. 363 sq.), he retains the idea of a generation and corruption of constitutions and allows for the happy medium and moderation. But this return to Aristotle acquires meaning only on the condition that one measures the effects of the substitution of a theory of freedom for a theory of justice.

11Placing moderation, the legislator’s cardinal virtue, in the foreground constitutes, to be sure, a major point of convergence between Aristotle and Montesquieu. In Nichomachean Ethics, médiétè consists of a relation of adequacy ever new to difference; it varies in function of the set of singular and contingent circumstances into which the agent is placed. Determination of the correct rule with respect to affections and actions assumes that one knows the extremes so as to choose the happy médiétè “with respect to us.” That relation, determined thanks to the experience that makes the prudent man, corresponds to the best possible adaptation to a situation. The perfection of virtue is therefore that of suitability to circumstances: action inserts itself “as appropriate,” opportunely, into the flow of the world – which allows it to “succeed” in its effects. Now in The Spirit of Law, likewise, moderate political art must preserve a happy medium between two extremes, excess and lack: “This I declare, and it feels as if I have written this book solely to prove it: the legislator’s spirit must be one of moderation; the political good like the moral good is always between two boundaries” (XXIX, 1; our italics). The moderate legislator is the one who examines, among several thresholds, how legislation can vary in order to produce the desired effects. Thus for the formalities of justice: if their absence characterizes despotism, their multiplication could imperil freedom. The real issue is to find a middle ground between too much and too little, which characterizes moderation. Between the extremes of excess and lack which would lead to the disappearance of political freedom, Montesquieu no more than Aristotle indicates the happy medium or the middle ground that is precisely appropriate in situ: moderation belongs to prudence as an adaptation to circumstances (Manin 2024, pp. 135-139). So too for the proportion to establish between corporal, symbolic, and pecuniary punishments: “A good legislator adopts a happy medium,” which cannot be made more precise (VI, 18). So too for the adequate relation between the grandeur and duration of magistracies (II, 3) or the fixation of an interest rate, which derives, between two threshholds, from a complex arbitration with an eye to prosperity (XXII, 19).

12Nevertheless, the Aristotelian problematic of the political good – the just – is transposed into the modern field, given the primacy of freedom defined as “the opinion one has of his security”: the end of all government is no longer to realize the “common good” or to achieve man’s particular excellence, but to protect his rights in the face of violence and the risks of the abuse of power. Determining justice as moderation therefore no longer suffices to make Montesquieu the simple continuer of Aristotle. Montesquieu proposes a new theory of moderation applied to the state: for the concept to be operative, one must know between what the extremes the exercise of each power of the state vulnerable to abuse varies (Binoche, pp. 245-286; Manin 2024, pp. 129-139).

13Finally, the transformation of a theory of justice into a theory of freedom leads to a critique of the Aristotelian theory of servitude. To be sure, in constructing his “ideal type,” Montesquieu takes note of the fact that ancient democracy supposed the existence of servile manpower devoted to agriculture and trade (IV, 8), and he adds in a note that Aristotle, like Plato, would have slaves till the soil, referring to the Laws VII [806 c] as well as to the Politics, VII, 10 [13]: “It is true that agriculture was not everywhere exercised by slaves; on the contrary, as Aristotle says [in note: Pol., VI, 4], the best republics were those where the citizens worked the land; but that happened only through the corruption of ancient governments that had become democratic, for in the earliest times the cities of Greece lived in aristocracy.” But book XV of The Spirit of Law proposes a critique of civil slavery: “Aristotle [in note : Pol., I, 1 (=5)] attempts to prove that there are slaves by nature, and what he says does not prove it at all. I think that if such exist, they are those I have just mentioned. But as all men are born equal, we must say that slavery is unnatural, although in certain countries it is based on a natural reason; and we really must distinguish those countries from others where even natural reasons reject it, like the nations of Europe where it has so happily been abolished.” (XV, 7). If there really are slaves “by nature” according to Montesquieu, it will therefore be in a very different sense from what Aristotle was invoking: the slave by nature is not the robust man (suited to labor of execution), unsuited for deliberation and therefore not apt for command (Pol., I, 2, 4-5, 13), but the subject of warm countries unable to work without fear of sanctions.

14Just as Aristotle proposed his version of an ethics according to nature, Montesquieu thus proposes his vision of a politics according to nature. But the objective has changed: henceforth the point is to avoid the worst (despotism) rather than to pursue the best. Montesquieu’s study of the conditions of freedom takes precedence over the theory of justice. The Aristotelian influence is thus attenuated from book XI on and especially from book XIV on of The Spirit of Law: for reflection on political regimes distinguished by organization and distribution of powers, is replaced by a study of the diversity of societies; political analysis of types, is replaced, from book XIV on, by a study of the causes of social phenomena (climate, mode of subsistence, customs, manners, economy, religion) and of their possible contribution to political freedom.

Simone Goyard-Fabre, “L’héritage aristotélicien dans la pensée de Montesquieu,” Diotima 7 (1979), pp. 86-96.

Bernard Manin, “Montesquieu et la politique moderne,” Cahiers de philosophie politique, Reims, nos. 2-3, OUSIA, 1985, pp. 197-229, reprinted in Lectures de “L’Esprit des lois”, dir. Thierry Hoquet and Céline Spector, Bordeaux: Presses Universitaires de Bordeaux, 2004, pp. 171-231.

Catherine Larrère, “Montesquieu et le républicanisme,” Bulletin de la Société Montesquieu 5 (1993), pp. 12-28.

Bertrand Binoche, Introduction à “De l’esprit des lois” de Montesquieu, Paris: PUF, 1998.

Bernard Manin, Montesquieu, Paris: Hermann, “L’Avocat du diable,” 2024, ch. ii.

Céline Spector, Servitude et Empire: Montesquieu, des “Lettres persanes” à “L’Esprit des lois”, Paris: Vrin, 2024, ch. ii.